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Abstract 
 
In this paper it’s analyzed the concept of budget deficit and the trend of this situation 
in budget policy. That’s seen through the comparison of the various member countries 
deficits and public debt figures as per cents from GDP in previously determined period of 
time. Since the obvious slowdown in the budget deficit numbers, it is also paid attention to 
the fiscal rules which led to reduction in the deficits and public debts. Especially focus is 
enlightened on the functionality of the Stability and Growth Pact, the arguments for existence 
of fiscal rules and the effects of the debt finance on the economy. 
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Introduction 
 Today almost every country strives to achieve economic development through 
implementation of deficit finance in fiscal policy. This measure will increase the real GDP 
form one side, but also will increase the price level on the other. Thus, both on short term are 
doubtful. The point here is to see how the fiscal rules impact the budget deficit and public 
debt status in all European Union countries. The comparison between member countries 
supplies vital data for deficit and debt trajectory. Also it gives attention to the Stability and 
Growth Pact framework. In order to sustain this way of finance the government must 
continue to indebt herself to respond to the intensive spending or capital investment in 
various government projects. In this text we can see the factors that cause governments to 
decide for implementation of deficit policy.  
 
Historical review of budget deficit and public debt 
The budget deficit in the last 20 years had a very substantial progression line in the 
developing countries, shown as a percentage of GDP. The major deficits appeared after the 
oil crises in the middle of the 70-ties and dramatically spread out after the 80-ties mainly as a 
result of the excess public consumption, and not because the inefficiency in the tax payment. 
The public expenses rose from 28 % from GDP in 1960 to 50 % from GDP in 1994. These 
deficits were the reason for the intensive accumulation of public debt which increased to 70 
% from GDP in 1995 from previous 40% in 1980 and therefore reducing the finances and the 
exploitation of the economic recourses. The picture was different before the war. The 
developed countries had fiscal deficits and surpluses that have been low, but the decreasing 
financial condition of there national treasuries enforced them to borrow against the future. It 
is very interesting that in the after war period, five from seven big countries still pursued 
deficit budget policies despite the satisfactory level of economic development. Therefore, 
many economists consider that the focus on the social programs, demographic trends and 
fundamental macroeconomic turnovers were the main reasons for the fiscal collapse of many 
countries or in other words, the negative impact of the major recessions in that countries.  
 The major problem with this policy is that governments intend to neutralize negative 
shocks in the economy with budget deficit and therefore not be aware of the problems that 
could acquire in sense of sustainability of these deficits. The budget deficit inevitably leads to 
increase in the public debt which must be serviced in the future. So, if the rate of the 
economic growth is smaller then the interest rate of the government debt, there will be 
intensified debt affinities leading to never ending increase of the debt-GDP ratio. In that case 
the only way out for the intensive country indebting will be the creation of money in form of 
revenues which will reduce the deficit, but in other hand increase the inflation rate. 
The budget deficit is defined as difference between what the government spends and 
what the government collects. The excess of revenues over spending during a period of time 
is known as budget surplus. There are two sources for government to collect money for 
realizing it`s fiscal goals, tax and debt. The first one is very unpopular and unpopulistic 
government instrument for securing money flow, while the borrowing is more acceptable 
way for collecting additional funds. However to choose between taxes and debt is one of the 
most sensitive questions in the field of public finance. There are a lot of debates concerning 
the necessity of the governments to force that kind of fiscal policy, because of potential 
damages that the economy may suffer in the long run. 
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In the following table are presented data for the latest deficits and public debt 
numbers in the European Union through which can be foreseen the dynamic in their 
movement. 
Table 1  Budget deficit and Public debt in EU-27              
          % from GDP 
EU-27 
2004 
 
2005 2006 2007 
Deficit
1
 
Public 
debt
2
 
Deficit 
Public 
debt 
Deficit 
Public 
debt 
Deficit 
Public 
debt 
Belgium 0.0 94.2 -2.3 92.1 0.3 88.2 -0.2 84.9 
Bulgaria 1.4 37.9 1.8 29.2 3.0 22.7 3.4 18.2 
Czech 
Republic 
-3.0 30.4 -3.6 29.7 -2.7 29.4 -1.6 28.7 
Denmark 1.9 43.8 5.0 36.4 4.8 30.4 4.4 26.0 
Germany -3.8 65.6 -3.4 67.8 -1.6 67.6 0.0 65.0 
Estonia 1.6 5.1 1.8 4.5 3.4 4.2 2.8 3.4 
Ireland 1.4 29.5 1.6 27.4 3.0 25.1 0.3 25.4 
Greece -7.4 98.6 -5.1 98.0 -2.6 95.3 -2.8 94.5 
Spain -0.3 46.2 1.0 43.0 1.8 39.7 2.2 36.2 
France -3.6 64.9 -2.9 66.4 -2.4 63.6 -2.7 64.2 
Italy -3.5 103.8 -4.2 105.8 -3.4 106.5 -1.9 104.0 
Cyprus -4.1 70.2 -2.4 69.1 -1.2 64.8 3.3 59.8 
Latvia -1.0 14.9 -0.4 12.4 -0.2 10.7 0.0 9.7 
Lithuania -1.5 19.4 -0.5 18.6 -0.5 18.2 -1.2 17.3 
Luxembourg -1.2 6.3 -0.1 6.1 1.3 6.6 2.9 6.8 
Hungary -6.5 59.4 -7.8 61.6 -9.2 65.6 -5.5 66.0 
Malta -4.6 72.6 -3.0 70.4 -2.6 64.2 -1.8 62.6 
Netherlands -1.7 52.4 -0.3 52.3 0.5 47.9 0.4 45.4 
Austria -3.7 63.8 -1.5 63.5 -1.5 61.8 -0.5 59.1 
Poland -5.7 45.7 -4.3 47.1 -3.8 47.6 -2.0 45.2 
Portugal -3.4 58.3 -6.1 63.6 -3.9 64.7 -2.6 63.6 
Romania -1.2 18.8 -1.2 15.8 -2.2 12.4 -2.5 13.0 
Slovenia -2.3 27.6 15.8 27.5 -1.2 27.2 -0.1 24.1 
Slovakia -2.4 41.4 -2.8 34.2 -3.6 30.4 -2.2 29.4 
Finland 2.4 44.1 2.9 41.3 4.1 39.2 5.3 35.4 
Sweden 0.8 51.2 2.2 50.9 2.3 45.9 3.5 40.6 
United 
Kingdom 
-3.4 40.4 -3.4 42.1 -2.6 43.1 -2.9 43.8 
 Source: Euro stat 
                                                          
1
 According to the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the EU Treaty, government deficit 
(surplus) means the net borrowing (net lending) of the whole general government sector (central government, 
state government, local government and social security funds). It is calculated according to national accounts 
concepts (European System of Accounts, ESA95).  
2
 Government debt is the consolidated gross debt of the whole general government sector outstanding at the end 
of the year (at nominal value). 
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From the table data we can see that the excessive deficit procedure in practice gives 
results, because in almost every country the deficit figures are falling down. In this table we 
analyze the period from 2004 to 2007. In correlation of previous spoken this is used as 
overview for the current deficit and debt situation in the European Union. In 2007 the largest 
government deficit in percentage of GDP was recorded in Hungary (-5.5%), the United 
Kingdom (-2.9%), Greece (-2.8%), France (-2.7%) and Portugal (-2.6%). Opposite of that, 
eleven EU countries succeeded to achieve surplus in the budget in the same year: Finland 
(+5.3%), Denmark (+4.4%), Sweden (+3.5%), Bulgaria (+3.4%), Cyprus (+3.3%), 
Luxemburg (+2.9%), Estonia (+2.8%), Spain (+2.2%), Netherlands (+0.4%), Ireland (+0.3%) 
and Germany (0.0%). 
As we saw from the table, almost every country with some exceptions is in favor of 
respecting the 3% deficit fiscal rule. While the other rule, about the public debt, is realized 
through the balanced budget rule in medium run. At the end of 2007 in Estonia (3.4%), 
Luxemburg (6.8%), Latvia (9.7%) and Romania (13%) had been noticed the lowest 
government debt to GDP ratios in EU. Opposite of that, countries like Italy (104%), Greece 
(94.5%), Belgium (84.9%), Hungary (66%), Germany (65%), France (64.2%), Portugal 
(63.6%) and Malta (62.6%) had the highest government debt ratios in 2007. From the 
statistics we can conclude that every country in EU tends to reduce their public debt ratio 
with exception of Italy, which debt is highest in euro area. These results show that 
surveillance and dissuasive part from the Stability and Growth Pact gave a positive and 
different approach in governance with the fiscal policies.  
 
Stability and Growth Pact 
Before we pay tribute to the fiscal criteria’s, we’ll shortly describe those two essential 
parts from the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The first step is the surveillance part, which 
main objective is to prevent countries from entering into excessive deficit procedure. 
Members of the Euro zone must submit Stability Programme with focus on the public finance 
- aim for achieving balanced budgetary position or surplus. Further these programs are 
revised by the Council in order to conclude if the country satisfies the necessary safety 
margins to avoid excessive deficit. Therefore if the country deviates significantly from the 
medium term objective, the Council gives a recommendation for future steps.
3
 Second part of 
the SGP is the dissuasive procedure, it defines the excessive deficit as outrun of the 
referenced 3% value, except if it’s exceptional and temporary (natural disaster or severe 
economic downturn-annual decline of GDP at least of 2%). If the decline is less of 0.75%, the 
country shouldn’t use exceptionality of the deficit. On recommendation from the 
Commission, the Council decides if exists excessive deficit and recommends effective action 
from the country in period of four months in order to correct the deficit. If that doesn’t lead to 
corrective action, there will be imposed sanctions upon the member country. In that case the 
country will have to make non-interest bearing deposit calculated through the following 
formula: Dep=0.2+0.1(Def-3), where Def is deficit and other variables are expressed as per 
cent of GDP. According to the rules, if the country in period of two years doesn’t correct the 
excessive deficit, the deposit is activated or turned in to a fine.   
The criteria’s for European accession are basic benchmarks for each country 
candidate for member. These conditions are already met by the countries members of the EU 
                                                          
3
 Commission of the European Communities, The role of quality of public finances in the EU governance 
framework, Sec (2008) 2092 
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and they are aware of the criteria’s that constantly must be obeyed in order not to be 
subjected to penalties. All this is necessary, if the EU wants to have organized institutions 
through which it could realize her policies. When it comes in question the fiscal policy of the 
EU, it must be known that every country implements own national fiscal policy but in terms 
of following the benchmarks posted with the Stability and Growth Pact. With the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1999 were set rules (the 3% deficit and 60 % debt – fiscal norms) for conduct of the 
member countries and the countries with aspiration for becoming member countries of EU. 
This Treaty appeals to the Stability and Growth Pact as guide for national budgetary policies. 
First rule implies that countries must aspire to achieve balanced budget in medium run (over 
the business cycle). This is more restricted norm in comparison to 60 % debt. It means that 
the country shouldn’t add new debt on the existing one over the business cycle. Secondly, the 
rule of 3 % budget deficit. This means that in worse case the country will be subjected to 
penalties for not following the European Commission suggestions. Germany proposal 
suggested that the countries be fined instantly after they breach the criteria from 3 % and face 
of with rejection from most countries. That’s why European Commission sends warning to 
the countries which intend to break the rule before doing it and are given new opportunity to 
correct their direction in economic policy. Last case that turned on the public focus in Europe 
was United Kingdom, despite Hungary. That action was accepted with great embarrassment 
by their prime minister in the mentioned country. A third view of the Stability Pact includes 
some exemptions in case of higher powers i.e. natural disaster or decline of their GDP of 
more then 2 % during one year. When the drop of GDP is among 0, 75 and 2 % the country 
comes forward before the Council of Ministers to defend their justifications for exceptional 
deficit. Countries that suffered 0, 75 % drop in their GDP will not invoke exceptional 
circumstances. These conditions are elaborated in details in the Stability and Growth Pact 
framework.
4
 
 
Arguments for fiscal rules 
The enforcement of fiscal rules in budget policy is justified by following. First, the 
country with good intension of increasing debt - GDP ratio may cause pressure on the capital 
market by raising the interest rates, and therefore those of the government securities of the 
other union members too. In this case the irresponsible fiscal policy of one country may lead 
to restrictive fiscal policy in the other EU member countries, because the increases in interest 
rates will increase the burden of the other countries debt. That is why it’s needed an 
instrument for budget restriction which will downsize the deficit. The second argument lights 
the pressure of the other member countries on the ECB demanding more relaxed monetary 
policy as a response to the uncontrolled fiscal policy of one member country. 
Despite the relative truth in these arguments, they are denied. The first denial assumes 
that the capital markets are inefficient, which is totally unacceptable in developed integrated 
union. If one EU country has dynamic debt trajectory, that wouldn’t necessesary mean 
pressure on the interest rates in other EU countries. The financial market will recognize the 
risk in the particular country government debt portfolio and will allow other countries to 
borrow at lower interest rate then the indebted one. So, if the capital markets are efficient, 
interest rates would be different in each country according to risk premium, and there 
wouldn’t be reason for negative spillover effect.  
                                                          
4
 Paul De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, Oxford University Press, Sixth Edition 2005 
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However, there is probability that lenders may step in, if they sense negative deep 
debt dynamic. The possibility of spreading out the financial crises through the financial 
institutions will be argument enough for bailing out the indebted country. Doing so appears 
problem of correct assessment of the premium risk that will be implemented in the interest 
rates. That is believed to be one of the essential problems for effective market functioning. 
That may be explained through purchasing government securities from that country by 
financial institutions from other member countries. In that scenario the negative implications 
will automatically reflect the other financial institutions, buyers of that government papers, 
and spillover the financial crises. The “bail out” guarantees that there is no place for panic 
and that the purchase of securities will lower the risk premium of the indebted country. 
The second explanation for inefficiency of fiscal rules or argument for not enforcing 
them is the Gramm - Rudman legislation in USA, which set out explicit fiscal targets 
regarding federal deficit. According to that act, the spending had been cut in order to meet the 
legal targets. But that approach showed that not always the fiscal rules are considered to be 
100 % efficient mean of controlling the fiscal policy, because there will be always someone 
who will  try to bypass that legal obstacle, in the particular case - spending had been shown 
as item in the “off budget” account.   
 
Public debt burden 
 After careful consideration of the budget deficit status in European Union and the 
arguments for implementation of the fiscal rules, it is inevitable shortly to point out the 
implications of the national debt. The national debt is the total amount of money that the 
government owes for goods and services but is never paid for. It is interesting that the deficit 
tends to increase the real GDP and the price level in the economy. The desire of these effects 
on short run is doubtful. 
If the government runs budget policy of deficit, it spends more then it receives 
revenues. In order to fund the spending, the government needs to make a loan. That is usually 
done through issuing government bonds. In doing so, it competes with the private borrowers 
for money lent by savers, raising interest rates and causing “crowding out” effect on the 
private investment. Money is diverted from the private companies towards the government 
for funding budget deficit instead for investment.  
However, there is also a “crowding in” effect. The government spending affects on 
the private investment behavior in a way that stimulates production of larger output in order 
to respond to the government demands. Therefore the private investor must invest in capital 
in order to increase its productivity. In this way the government stimulates the economy 
through this “crowding in” effect.  
In the case of open economy, this kind of policy has impact on the exchange rate and 
the trade balance. In the case of expansionary fiscal policy, the high interest rate due to the 
government borrowing attracts foreign capital. The demand for domestic currency in order to 
invest in that country raises causing appreciation in the exchange rate. The appreciation 
makes the imported goods cheaper and the exported goods expensive in abroad, leading to 
decline in the trade balance. Since the foreigners sell more to the country than they buy from 
it, they acquire asset ownership in the country. This effect in the eighties was familiar as 
concept of “twin deficits” (budget and trade). 
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It is generally known that the “crowding out” is stronger than the “crowding in” 
effect. However, some delicate situations like economic downfalls request for “crowding in” 
effect as positive budget deficit policy measure.  
This concept of government finance through indebting will have to be in some point 
of time replaced with the inevitable source – tax. So the debt burden is shifted to the future 
generations in sense of payment of higher taxes, all in order to be able to neutralize the 
negative effects of budget deficit. 
 
Conclusion 
 In these modern times the government financing is considered to have more deficit 
oriented policy which through debt tries to secure money for the government spending. This 
manner of finance is realized with issue of government bonds. In this way the pressure on the 
private capital is enormous causing interest rates to rise and “crowd out” the private 
investments. Despite this source of securing money flow the government may use other not 
so popular instrument and that’s the enforcement of tax in order to increase the money flow 
from the revenue side. This paper through the analysis of the deficit movement in the member 
countries of the European Union provides a clear picture for the current fiscal policy in each 
country. According to that movement, the European countries strive to achieve balanced 
budget in medium-term, which on the other hand provides reduction in the budget deficit and 
public debt figures. Therefore, the implementation of the previously mentioned fiscal rules 
gives positive results in enforcement efficient fiscal policy in EU. For the first time from the 
seventies, it is noticed adequate desirable change in the fiscal policy of the EU countries, 
primary as result of the Stability and Growth Pact framework. After all the efficient 
implementation of the fiscal rules is the main reason for the current positive deficit and debt 
situation in the EU countries.    
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